This page will show some notes, ongoing work, and thoughts about the Masters degree I will be pursuing this year on ‘Values and Environment’. If you are interested in the subject, look in regularly for updates and ideas, Staring at the end of September.
First, the description/explanation. Here, in the first instance, the subject is our (humanity’s/the individual’s) relationship with the world (nature, the environment) . In particular, the ethical relationship, that is, the regulation of human actions on non-human, (living) objects of action.
What we want to find out, then, is what we should or shouldn’t do, what we should constrain ourselves and (human) others from doing and, of real significance, why. The ‘why’ is the attempt to establish the reasoning behind the rules we make, and the rational justification for our rules and, broadly, ‘values’.
The questions in the context of the Masters course relate specifically to the environment and, as it is my own personal interest, the climate system. What I want to work out and express are the principles underlying the decisions which we make about the climate in particular and the environment in general. At this point, merely at the start of the exploration, I bring in a pre-existing attitude to philosophy and to the subject of the course, which is confused, being imperfect, but is broadly based on an existential/phenomenological view of what it means to be human.
I hope to be able to demonstrate that both our values and the environment, the two subjects of debate, can be rationally founded on the phenomenological conception of human meaning, and that, through a development of existing reasoning on the subject, a solid and practical foundation can exist for important everyday decisions for individuals and institutions (collectives). Thus, phenomenology becomes the baseline from which a practical contemporary ethics can be constructed which informs the decision-making process and justifies those decisions.
So the project is ambitious; to demonstrate (even in part, a small new element, perhaps) that what we do, how we interact with the world and the climate, should be justified by reference to a set of principles founded on a rational extension of the basic human question; what we are, and what it means for us to be.
If time allows, this may extend into a practical case-study, which at this early stage might be called ‘the phenomenology of climate’; a philosophical grounding of the ‘defining issue’ of our generation. By extension, what is found to be rationally ‘right’ for the climate should, in theory, also be ‘right’ for the environment as a whole.
Please note that comments are enabled on this page, and you are welcome to make this a dialogue, not only if you are a fellow student, but also if the subject interests or confuses you.
Be loved.
Update; October 8th.
So, we’re starting off by looking at one of the first ideas in EE: the instrumental-intrinsic debate. Is the environment [climate] valuable because of its relation to us, humans, as its exploiters/users, or in its own right?
Sticking to the climate; what is the object under moral consideration? Are we talking about the atmosphere, the oceans too, or the things which cause changes in climate? What is it that is the source of the problem?
What seems to be unique about climate change ethics is that its impact potential is larger than any other area effected by human activity/intervention since the advent of the nuclear bomb. The scale of the problems faced, and the potential solutions, makes this a global problem. What is also becoming clear is that there are two ‘matters’ which need decisions to be made to produce ‘results’ (eg, a change in human behaviour). The first set of matters are the environment, including the specifically human element, and the effect that climate change as a force will have on this, both as a whole, and in parts. In parts, because many countries and regions will face problems relative to their geographic location and capacity to adapt to change, as a whole, because the evidence is increasing tha, by virtue of the knock-on effects if nothing else, no country will be unaffected by climate change.
And here is a second peculiarity of climate change ethics; it has to deal with environmental, political, atmospheric and economic issues. In this sense, it could be argued that climate change is the unifier of the globe; certainly, if solution, or at least mitigation, is to be achieved, then global unity on action is almost certainly required.
Does this imply that some kind of ethics unifying all these disparate issues, which have for some time had their own criteria to work from, which are not necessarily mutually compatible, is therefore necessary? Some argue that it is the solutions which matter, not the principles; others that without a sound principle at work, effective solutions may be hard, if not impossible, to implement.
Update October 24th
The problem of definition
Climate change and its associated ethics has generally been considered to be a problem of Environmentalism. It’s easy to see why; after all, the climate is intrinsically bound to the environment, and definitions of types of environment, and ideas like evolution, depend on the idea of a type of climate, variations in climate. So we have got used to the idea that, as acid rain or the ozone layer are environmental issues, so too is the problem of AGW.
But it seems clear to me that this is far too limiting an idea. Climate impacts are impacts on the environment (and people). Climate change is a change to the whole system, not one part. But what is the climate? Is it ‘sick’? Why does a changing climate matter?
There are problems here. In one sense, the sense in which climate refers to the average of trended details of weather, it is a sort of mathematical entity. But it is also a real thing in the world; we do, after all, have the Koppen-Geigen climate maps (just updated, btw). So ‘climate’ refers to a localised ‘mean state’ defined in relation to the consistency of patterns over time, as they manifest in land/surface typologies. Therefore, ‘climate change’ can be said to refer to the changes in typology of land areas, caused by a change in the dominant climate trends which define them.
At the moment, about a quarter of the land surface has a desert climate; another quarter is Boreal forest or Taiga, and so forth. So, ‘global climate change’ might refer to the way in which some of these types are increasing, while others are decreasing.
More later; I’m a bit busy today…
Old man in a cave 
7 comments
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December 19, 2007 at 7:13 am
Paul Baer
Dear Fergus:
I admire you for taking these problems on systematically. I imagine you will find that it is very hard to find a robust grounding for the propositions you find prima facie irrefutable. This is a longstanding philosophical problem that is not unrelated to the classic parent/child dialectic – every answer can be replied to with another “why?” until you’re frustrated and scream “Because I said so!” Nonetheless I believe progress can be made, or I would never have taken up the ethics problems within climate change.
I presume you already have the relevant reading list? If not I’ll be happy to help you put it together. If you email me at pbaer@ecoequity.org I’ll send you a couple of articles that are in press that you wouldn’t otherwise know about, as well as a manuscript that is published in an unreasonably expensive and inaccessible book.
My own answers, if you’ll forgive me for trying to summarize in a few bullets, look like this:
1) the “intrinsic vs instrumental” argument is a dead end. Value is a fundamentally human concept, and while we may ourselves value things that are of no “use” to us, it is ultimately impossible to argue that a universe that has (say) biodiversity is in any way better than one that doesn’t, except from a human perspective. And that human perspective is not merely “instrumental,” it is in a very deep sense aesthetic (James Risbey has a good article on the role of aesthetic values in climate policy.)
2) At the heart of our concern for climate change is basic egalitarianism – an equal concern for the suffering and life conditions of all persons, now and in the future. I contend that egalitarianism is at the heart of all progressive ethical and political philosophies, but that because it isn’t one of the recognized “categories” its common role goes largely undiscussed (but see Dworkin’s “Sovereign Virtue”.)
3) Ethics as a whole is best understood in the light of pragmatist approaches to philosophy. Community discourse provides the only validation of ethical premises but community consensus is not in itself a reliable justification for ethical principles of action. I haven’t read a great deal of the original pragmatist ethics but what I have read suggest that they (especially Dewey, and later in the differently labeled but similarly intended “discourse ethics” tradition, Habermas) had it close to right.
I could probably come up with a few more bullets but I’m supposed to finish some spreadsheets and figures before I go to bed! I’ll be interested in your thoughts both now and as they develop further.
best,
–Paul
December 19, 2007 at 12:03 pm
fergusbrown
Hi, Paul. I am glad you have found this, since your work at EcoEquity was one of the reasons why I got into the subject at this level. The first semester’s work has largely been a process of filling in the historical context of current environmental debate and establishing where we stand at the moment. this means the my early comments were more of a description and statement of intent rather than a source of focus.
On your primary remarks, is this philosophical problem not resolved (at least in some ways) by existential phenomenology? The ultimate answer (if we are indeed ontological beings) to the question why might be; ‘…since you ask…’
though a phenomenologist might be tempted to return the question, to establish a dialogue wherein the questioner questions his questioning. There are points to be dealt with, on the possibility of circularity and whether or not the phenomenological description of being can be posited as an a priori, but this is possibly for another time…
I’m always amenable to more reading, so I will email you for a list and any useful links you know of to good material; thank you. Meantime, if it’s okay with you, I’ll continue with your points:
1: I agree. The problem I am having is that, as things stand, the debate on the principles underlying an agreement about action on climate change is deeply embedded in instrumentalist (and anthropocentric) views of what is of value. My feeling is that, if genuine progress is to be made, on this or any other question of environment or human justice, such a foundation is inadequate to the purpose; in other words, it is unlikely to lead to what we might think of as the ‘desirable’ conclusions (excuse the logic jump). But rather than posit one or other of these positions, by making use of the existing definition of what it means to be human (both ontologically and psychologically) which is a starting point in Ex.Phen.; we are a ‘being-with-in-the-world’, we can bypass what turns out to be a false distinction. It turns out, if we are indeed as much a product of our place in the world as we are of our relationship to others and our sense of being ourselves, then what is of value to that world is also of value to us, and likewise, what benefits or harms our world also benefits and harms us.
By this means, we can claim that anthropocentric-nonanthropocentric, and instrumental-intrinsic, are false dichotomies, non-issues, since they are all a part of what we are as humans.
This takes us back to that fundamental notion of a division between that which is ‘of the human’ and that which ‘of nature’, which is itself a throwback to a different time/place, and dissolves the distinction, the sense that the physical Otherness of place (the world) is alien and hostile (in the same way that human Others are not to be understood as ‘hostile’); rather, as in the being-with we are made more complete through a letting-be which is possible through the non-appropriative gaze (the eye contact) between the self and other, so in the being-here, we are made more more complete through a letting-be which might grasp, to touch, but does not seek to take, to appropriate.
2. What is/are the ‘fundamentally important’ ethical value? Such a question can probably not be answered through argument to an a priori position. It seems likely that this is something which needs to be decided and, in human society, agreed upon, for an ethical principle to have a practical application. Along with egalitarianism (or, more widely, the range of value-concepts including this, justice and fairness), I would also place the liberty-nexus (self-determination, freedom) at the heart of an ethic. A part of me wants to place a third fundamental at the heart of an ethic, but I am not sure yet how it can be expressed, or where it might take us. Perhaps one contender is Truth.
3. I’ll have to do some background reading on community discourse before responding to your comments on this. Broadly, I agree that Ethics matters because it has real-world application and consequence. My tendency, though, is to look for the principle first and then draw a practical application from it to guide action, rather than to seek to justify a desired practical goal ‘in the other direction’.
As they are finished, I’ll post my essays on these ideas up here for criticism/discussion. Next semester will be a more thorough investigation into phenomenology and ethics, and, with luck, a clarification of some of the ideas I have outlined above. After that, we may be in a position to start presenting a ‘new’ way of understanding the problems arising from both environmental and climate change issues.
All the best,
Fergus.
December 19, 2007 at 1:10 pm
guthrie
Did someone mention value?
Lomborg had a piece in yesterdays SCotsman claiming that spending money on global warming when there were poor people dying from the effects fo smoke inhalation was a bit skewed.
This is going to be the harder bit- getting people to think about values and ethics. Unfortunately these have been effectively removed from modern politics.
December 20, 2007 at 3:26 am
Paul Baer
Hi Fergus – glad that you found my contribution interesting (and of course even more glad that you have found my larger project to be inspirational).
I’d be interested for pointers to “existential phenomenology” — the bits in your writing are intriguing but still very unclear to me.
There is much more in your response that I look forward to engaging. Here’s two bits for now:
First, I’m inclined to take egalitarianism as “more fundamental” than liberty, thinking along the lines of Rawls; similarly I think both “justice” and “fairness” can only be “cached out” (to use the jargon) reasonably in terms of an egalitarian commitment. But it may be that I’m simply creating a definition of egalitarianism that suits my own needs but doesn’t match up to what others consider it to mean.
Second, vis a vis principle to action vs. seeking to justify a desired goal, I don’t think it’s an either-or proposition. I don’t know if you’ve come across the concept “wide reflective equilibrium” in Rawls or subsequent authors, but essentially it involves reasoning that invokes both broad principles, specific judgments, and “background propositions”. At any time we have “sets” of all of them, and they have various elements of dissonance that cause us to question them. Such a process gives no particular privilege to which elements will be modified based on apparent contradiction, and assumes that any “equilibrium” may be (will be?) temporary, pending further encounters with reality…
happy to provide citations… don’t think you sent me your email address yet, though.
Best,
–Paul
July 11, 2008 at 5:35 am
Zero-Equals-Infinity
Collectives (governments being a prime example), and individuals are primarily motivated by self-interest, and on the most basic level by a desire for preservation of self. If, individuals and collectives can become viscerally aware of the dangers of human mono-culture, it is possible for there to be sufficient impetus to bring about change. Unfortunately, individuals are very good at justifying gain for themselves at the expense of others. This is socially encouraged and provides motivation for competition. We tend to see ourselves positionally in society and are encouraged to desire to increase our standing through the acquisition of status symbols. This is problematic because the cost of these symbols (large houses, vehicles, et cetera) to the environment is so high.
What it really comes down to, is redefining social position by contribution and responsible behaviour, not ephemeral symbols of status and conspicuous consumption. People need to learn to trigger the various neurochemical reward and pleasure centres with actions that are beneficial. Likewise, as already alluded to, fear reactions to encroachments into vulnerable ecosystems and careless misuse and overuse of the environment, (of which we are an inseparable part), needs to be thoroughly instilled in people.
And please remember people react most strongly to things that stimulate an instinctive response. Intellectual appeal and argument holds little weight without a corresponding hook into instinctive “programs”. To convince people in large numbers requires them to be more afraid of the affect of not changing behaviour and lobbying government, even at the risk of standard of living. Of course, such things as the increasingly high price of oil will help both to encourage the development of alternate forms of energy and to increase efficiencies.
The intellectual in me would love nothing better than to see a new philosophy of environmental ethics, but without the hooks to instinctive fear that overrides greed, and without a new way of competing for social position which is not harmful, (and hopefully is even beneficial), to the environment, I am skeptical of it being realised.
November 21, 2008 at 3:13 pm
Alistair
I was stuck by a line in a Bahai text (I’m not Bahai though) which stated that egalitarianism imposed on a population was a no no because it stunts their evolution into a truly fulfilling and ‘sustainable’ state of being.
The logic is that sharing, born of compassion, should be a voluntary action. Egalitarianism might be a measuring stick by which we can judge the noble quality of a people.
Compassion for the animals people of the future and present might be included in this, as if the climate is decimated to an extent then life will be exceedingly difficult for most of the world’s 10 billion in 2040 (I mean more than now).
For me, the solution to this is inherently clear in this argument. We need to choose compassion now and expand our borders and empathy, as animal agriculture is both causing climate change and preventing the solution. I would be glad to know you touched on this in your thesis, good luck with that by the way.
My blog is at http://whirledpeas.com.au
November 30, 2008 at 11:18 am
fergusbrown
Hi Alistair and welcome.
As I understand it, in Levinas’s broadly ‘ethical’ work, equality is not a political imposition, but a state of being; at the fundamental level, we are all equal: in value, status, whatever. Of course, our ‘conditions’ are not equal. One of the first steps to having a ‘phenomenological approach’ to the world, to others, to ethics, is to come to an understanding/recognition of this.
This awareness of equality of status implies an equality (in principle) of rights. Whilst it is possible (my suggestion) that we can establish this as an ethical principle, in respect of others who are human, it is not so clear whether the same is true of others which are not, in other words, animals.
As things stand, I am comfortable with the idea that animals can have rights, but not their derivation. There is discussion to be had on whether there is, or should be, an equality between various forms of life, but my study to date precludes a conclusion as yet. By inclination, I tend to the view that the rights attributable to not-human being are given to them by humans, as the agents of ethics (and thus of rights themselves).
On the other hand, a part of my personal interpretation of the meaning of being involves the significant persistence of a world/place/home in which we share our beings. Therefore, the way in which we interact with that world is important. If we share equally our home place, and if we have equality of status, one person therefore does not have the right to act upon the place in such a way as to deprive another person of something.
You are probably correct to argue that a vegetarian world would be a ‘better’ one in terms of the fair distribution of resources. Plants require fewer resources than animals to farm, especially water, and less energy is consumed in their production than for animal ‘crops’. In terms of CO2, there is also a strong argument that a reduction in the intensity of animal farming would make a significant contribution to the reduction of energy demand and the production of emissions. Therefore, there is a strong case for adjusting our diets from the human-interest argument, irrespective of whether we can establish the separate question of the autonomous rights of animals.
In the same way that there is a common benefit to renewable energy, both to secure supply and reduce emissions, so likewise there can be a common benefit to reducing our meat production/consumption. Since I am uncertain whether a defining establishment of animal rights as fundamental can be achieved with the reasoning we have to date, can we be satisifed that the terms of human rights themselves, established as they are in a number of ways, can be sufficient to achieve the ulterior objective, namely, the reduction of exploitation of animals.
BTW, I am not a vegetarian. It’s been a while since you contributed, so I hope you pick up this message.
regards,